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Abstract
The proponents of responsible innovation (RI) have often opened their discus-
sions with the reassurance that while they are against irresponsible innovation,
they are not advocating irresponsible stagnation. In the two-by-two matrix gener-
ally used to illustrate this model of innovation, the quadrant for responsible stag-
nation has so far gone largely unmentioned, let alone explored. This paper draws
on existing real-world cases to examine what arguments drawn from ecological
economics might contribute to the discussion of RI. It questions the present
growth-driven paradigm and asks whether opening the black box of ‘responsible
stagnation’might also open the door for a reasoned discussion about resource con-
sumption and pace of development in over-productive or too-risky sectors and
technologies, as an intrinsic part of responsible innovation, rather than its
opposite.
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Proponents of responsible innovation (RI) have often opened their discussions
with a two-by-two matrix where one axis encodes the binary of ‘responsible’ and
‘irresponsible’, and the other ‘innovation’ and ‘stagnation’. RI, we are told, is
meant to prevent both irresponsible innovation and the irresponsible stagnation
which results from lack of investment in R&D, impeding the transfer of new and
important discoveries from the laboratory to the market. Through careful
anticipation of social, economic and environmental risks and benefits, reflection
on the part of scientists and innovators, inclusive engagement and subsequent
responsive action,1 RI promises to help bridge this ‘Valley of Death’ (UK
Commons, 2013), promoting a culture of innovation for societal benefit, jobs
and growth. Exactly how we are sure that innovation will drive growth, what
kind(s) of growth and whether we should even be seeking growth given our pla-
netary limitations are not questions which tend to be asked in most of the RI
literature, particularly not in the policy documents which have established
Responsible (Research and) Innovation as a means of governing scientific
research (see, for example, European Commission [EC], 2013). The implication
for both discourses is that if some is good, more is surely better, obscuring the
possibility that useful innovation can become irresponsible if allowed to grow
unchecked, as recently seen in the 2008 financial crisis (Owen et al., 2009).
Thus, while innovation may drive the global economy, it may also destroy it.
The statement that ‘innovation drives growth’ forms the basis not only of the
formative work in RI (see again Owen et al., 2009), but also of science, technol-
ogy and innovation (STI) policy as a whole. This formulation has allowed
policymakers to remain faithful to the assumptions of neo-classical economic
theory, limiting the transformative potential of RI for fear it might cause stagna-
tion, either in innovation or in growth. ‘Who’, we are asked, ‘would wave a flag
for Irresponsible Stagnation?’ (Stilgoe, 2013, p. xv) We agree: no one. Indeed
there are suggestions that not to innovate would be hugely irresponsible
given the problems humanity faces (Jones, 2014).
Within this matrix, however, there is one quadrant so far unexamined, which is
that ofResponsible Stagnation. Perhaps this is becausewhat ismeant by ‘stagnation’
is inherently ambiguous; it has both a techno-scientific and an economic meaning,
and, in both these fields, it is a negatively loaded term. Framed, as it has been, in a
matrix of binary opposites, agreeing that innovation is indeed desirable has effec-
tively black-boxed questions about the desirability of growth. Our question is
whether RI can instead use the concept of ‘responsible stagnation’ (RS) to clarify
and support its loftier goals, rather than setting itself in opposition to it.
Briefly examining the concept of RS in a recent editorial, Guston (2015, p. 2)
argues:
Given that innovation in part is what got us into this mess of pushing past pla-
netary limits in an unsustainable fashion, and that the drive for growth and the
satisfaction of the human needs and desires of a still increasing human population
globally is what compels innovation, we need to consider how we can stop being
dependent upon innovation and growth to get what we want .… [But that] is
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going to be dependent upon on [sic] the generation and implementation of new
knowledge and social and technological innovation each step of the way.
In other words, RS does not have to mean a cessation of invention, novelty and
creative problem-solving. We offer this paper as the first step in a research pro-
gramme we have been developing to open the black box of Responsible Stagna-
tion, teasing out such ambiguities and searching for empirical examples in order
to clarify what RS might mean, and what innovation might look like under a
model which is not based on the fallacy of a self-regulating economy with no
external limits to growth (Hatgioannides & Karanassou, 2011). We draw atten-
tion to heterodox theories which acknowledge the limited resources which may
be extracted from the environment and argue that RS might have something to
contribute to ecological economists’ discussions about balance and equilibrium
in the production and consumption of material goods, as well as opening the
possibility for discussion of innovation for controlled, deliberate degrowth of
unproductive, over-productive or existentially challenging sectors and technol-
ogies amongst scholars of RI. We would like to see heterodox economists begin
their own programme of reflexive engagement with the precepts of RI, in much
the same way that we are now requiring this of research scientists. At the same
time, proponents of RI must develop the necessary skills to reflexively examine
and, if necessary, challenge the limitations and excesses of the dominant growth-
based paradigm and seriously consider whether an alternative approach to
macroeconomics will be required in order to achieve RI’s ideals.
Background
Over the last five years, discussion of RI has grown from a small handful of
papers emanating from a corner of Science and Technology Studies (STS)
working on various aspects of governance of emerging technologies (Hellström,
2003; Owen & Goldberg, 2010; Robinson, 2009) to a veritable deluge. The
number of peer-review publications on RI has doubled each year from 2012
to 2014 and can be expected to double again this year (Figure 1). Added to
these totals should be the 45 articles now published each year in the Journal
of Responsible Innovation (JRI), which launched in January 2014 and is not
yet indexed by Web of Science (WoS), as well as the papers collected in four
edited volumes (Koops et al., 2015; Owen, Bessant, et al., 2013; Pavie et al.,
2014; van den Hoven et al., 2015).
Delving through the 123 papers indexed by WoS shows that discussion and
research into ways of involving the public more closely in the processes of inno-
vation and into developing RI frameworks, guidelines and models of implemen-
tation is taking place in fields as diverse as finance (Pandza & Ellwood, 2013),
port control (Ravesteijn et al., 2014), farming (Escareno et al., 2013) and
surgery (Hodges & Angelos, 2014). This is in addition to the already significant
body of work on RI from high-tech fields such as ICT, geo-engineering,
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nanotechnology and synthetic biology, based on constructive technology assess-
ment, upstream engagement and related approaches (Stilgoe et al., 2013; see also
Douglas & Stemerding, 2013; Grunwald, 2014; Rip, 2014; Stahl, 2012). The
concept is increasingly mainstreamed in research policy in a number of national
contexts, as well as in the EU, where Responsible Research and Innovation
(RRI) now has its own cross-cutting theme in Horizon 2020 (COM (2011)
808 final), the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation which
launched in 2014.
Although there is no singular definition of RI, in general it calls for continu-
ous engagement of the public along the entire innovation pathway from research
to the market, and careful assessment of possible risks, benefits and motivations
– including impact on values, morals and social relations, as well as on health,
the environment and the economy. It also, in one of its original formations,
calls for ‘a collective commitment of care for the future through responsive
stewardship of science and innovation in the present’ (Owen, Stilgoe, et al.,
2013, p. 36). The attention to unforeseeable social and environmental harm
owes much to RI’s antecedent, the ‘precautionary principle’ (COM (2000) 1),
which has significant traction amongst concerned policymakers (Gardiner,
2006), particularly in the EU, where it has achieved the force of law (von
Schomberg, 2013).
However, despite its emphasis on promoting public debate and attention to
adverse environmental and social impacts, it is important to note that RI, as a
framework for STI policy, emerged during a global economic crisis from
which it has been, particularly if viewed from the Eurozone, difficult to
escape. The context of crisis has both spurred the intensity of claims for the
economic advantages of investing public money in innovation, and closed off
many of the original moral arguments which suggested that RI could be used
to soothe public unease at the rapid pace of technological innovation by
Figure 1 Number of recent publications for responsible (research and) innovation on
Web of Science.
Source: http://webofknowledge.com.
Note: Figures based on a topic search for Boolean string ‘responsible+innovation OR
responsible+research+and+innovation’, carried out on 4 October 2015.
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opening some decision-making structures to public participation and examin-
ation. Within this strand of argumentation, much is made of the ‘failure’ of
genetically modified organisms in Europe (see EC, 2013, p. 14) and of the rela-
tive success of upstream engagement with nanotech, at least in the sense that its
introduction to the market (particularly via the cosmetics industry), has for the
most part gone uncontested.2 Overall, while there has been much discussion of
‘responsibility’ in the context of unknown risks, considerably less attention is
paid to ‘innovation’ and to how differing understandings of this word, exacer-
bated by the multiplicity of academic disciplines now engaging with various
aspects of RI, may be leading to outcomes which are the opposite of those
intended by its earliest proponents. Whereas many people would define inno-
vation simply as something new, others argue that this is invention, which
alone does not constitute innovation. Barry (2001, p. 211), in fact, argues that
invention is neither merely new nor always technological, but is about the
capacity of something new to change current arrangements. By this definition,
innovation is the process by which invention is taken up and circulated, creating
the capacity for change. Economics, business studies, engineering and to a large
extent natural science, however, have a more restricted definition of innovation
as a set of processes for bringing something new to the market. This explicit and
narrow definition of innovation as occurring only when something novel is ‘first
used in a company’s production process or is first offered for sale’ (Swann, 2009,
p. 23) delineates innovation as the creation of monetary value. As Blok and
Lemmens have recently pointed out, this formulation appears to have been
adopted uncritically within the RI literature, so that too often:
innovation is self-evidently seen as (1) technological innovation, (2) is primarily
perceived from an economic perspective, (3) is inherently good and (4) presup-
poses a symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees. (Blok &
Lemmens, 2015, p. 19)
The orthodox economic view that technology drives progress helps to explain
this coupling of innovation (as opposed to other forms of productive economic
activity) with a return to economic growth, a relationship which has become the
driving rationale for STI policy. The 1995 Green Paper on Innovation (COM
(95) 688) first set out the ‘European paradox’ as a problem of being unable to
translate Europe’s expertise in science into marketable products which would
help the EU to compete with the United States and Japan. However, innovation
at this time was seen as only one aspect of overall market activity. By 2010, a new
‘integrated, market-based, demand-driven approach’ (Anvret et al., 2010) was
being called for, the result of which is the EU’s present flagship policy, Inno-
vation Union, which exemplifies this very noticeable increase of emphasis on
‘innovation as the driver of growth’ (COM (2010) 546 final) and the only way
out of the present economic crisis (EC, 2012). However, once RI is unpacked
to reveal the moral underpinnings of its original formulation – in which ‘respon-
sible’ has a caretaker mission to ensure that new technologies are both
S. de Saille and F. Medvecky: Innovation for a steady state 5
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environmentally safe and sustainable (the requirements for which are not necess-
arily commensurate) – the relationship between RI and economic growth can
become very unhappy indeed.
RI is usually discussed in the context of high technology fields which promise
profound ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942 [2003]) as the fields of nano-
technology, biotechnology, information systems and cognitive science increas-
ingly overlap. These are lauded as platform technologies which will create
entirely new economic sectors, enabling new and presumably endless streams
of lucrative innovation. As much of the underlying science is still unproven,
making risk difficult to assess, this has also shifted the burden of responsibility
‘upstream’, towards those engaged in basic research and prototype engineering,
leaving those more actively engaged with downstream processes, such as
resource-producers, manufacturers, entrepreneurs, marketers and regulators,
operating as normal. The UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council (EPSRC), for example, has been instrumental in developing an RI fra-
mework for governance of projects using emergent technologies such as syn-
thetic biology and geo-engineering as part of a deliberate shift from mere
‘funder’ to ‘shaper’ of research (Stilgoe et al., 2013; see also EPSRC 2015b).
However, the EPSRC cannot, nor should it, be tasked with modifying business
and regulatory practices in the ways which will be necessary in order to ensure
that these technologies remain responsible to society and the environment as
they become incorporated into the market.
The EPSRC’s perspective on RI is also not necessarily shared by researchers
in non-technical disciplines which do not routinely commercialize the products
of their own research and therefore have their own definition of innovation. For
example, a 2012 press release by the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC) claimed a new study had found that the ‘UK hotel industry [is] alive
with innovation’.3 Here, the term ‘innovation’ was applied to the introduction
of energy-efficient lights, use of different fabrics for interior decoration and
purchase of accounting software, as well as the appearance of whole new
sectors within the industry itself, such as the emergence of ‘boutique’ hotels.
In other words, ‘innovation’ in this one document includes mundane practices
such as redecoration, as well as the actual invention and insertion into the
market of products, services and sectors aimed at entirely new ways of
making money. It provides an excellent example of the kind of confusion
increasingly surrounding the term as it gains traction as a buzzword in multiple
domains.
Although we do not argue that ours is the ‘correct’ definition, for the sake of
clarity, we will therefore begin our own discussion by an examination of what is
meant by the term. Along with Blok and Lemmens (2015), we argue that what
has been black-boxed in the literature of RI is not ‘responsibility’ – which has
been the subject of much interrogation – but ‘innovation’. By interrogating
our own understanding of the term, we aim first to show how the market-
based definition impedes the ability to decouple RI from the growth agenda
or to prevent ‘the market’ from functioning as a discursive stand-in for
6 Economy and Society
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Sh
eff
iel
d]
 at
 02
:29
 06
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
‘society’ (Rieff, 1999). We then use this decoupling to consider what might be
meant by responsible stagnation.
We define innovation as the process by which novelty is taken up and circulated
in the public sphere (including the application of something existing to something
entirely different), producing some kind of profound re-ordering of what-has-been,
something more fundamentally novel than changing light bulbs or redecorating
with natural fabrics. This does not exclude market-oriented innovation, but also
does not limit innovation to that which creates its value through the market.
Indeed, innovation can constitute a deliberate challenge to growth, through
seeking to reduce the circulation and purchase of new goods. Freecycle, for
example, is an innovation which created an international online community of
local groups of people who choose to give each other items which still have
use value, rather than offering them for sale, or simply throwing them away.
Innovation can also occur within areas traditionally protected from the
market. Research councils encourage proposals for methodological innovation,
which is aimed at new ways of producing and validating knowledge. Indeed, the
first use of the term ‘responsible innovation’ recorded by WoS (Duke, 1978) is a
call to apply the tools of technology assessment to anticipate the possible unin-
tended consequences of educational reform. Some might describe these as
‘social innovation’ precisely because they are not market-oriented. We,
however, would use that term in a more literal sense, as a direct innovation in
social order rather than a means to describe innovation arenas, such as open-
source software, which deliberately place themselves outside the market. The
invention and insertion into the British legal system of civil partnership as an
alternative marital institution for homosexual couples is one example of what
we would mean by social innovation.
These few examples give some idea of the conflicts embedded in the term
‘innovation’ – as goods and services for the market, as new forms of exchange
of goods outside the market, as ways of producing knowledge, as rearrangement
of social order. Which definition is used is, therefore, crucially important both
for interrogating the purpose and motivation for innovation, and to the discus-
sion of stagnation, as we will show below.
Innovation and economic growth
Orthodox economic models, such as the Solow–Swan model of long-run econ-
omic growth (taken as the starting-point for most neo-classical models), present
growth as resulting from either capital accumulation or technological progress
(Van den Berg, 2012). Technological progress here is not implicitly linked to
social progress, as it often is outside this realm, but is defined simply as any
change that leads either to an increase in the levels of output for the same levels of
input, or a decrease in input for the same levels of output (Hubbard et al., 2012).
Classic examples of technological progress include faster processing chips,
which lead to greater production for the same cost, or more efficient machines,
S. de Saille and F. Medvecky: Innovation for a steady state 7
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which lead to lower production costs for the same output. Blanchard and Sheen
(2007), for example, mention improved mechanical lubricant or new devices
such as the fax machine and mobile phones as examples of technological pro-
gress which lead to a greater output for a given level of input. This may
include higher manufacturing output or a decrease in the cost of information
management and sharing. These are indeed very much in keeping with the
notion of innovation as understood in the RI literature. However, while ‘stagna-
tion’ has a clear meaning in economics as a prolonged period of slow economic
growth, exactly what it means in the context of innovation is not clear. In order
to make sense of the idea of responsible stagnation, therefore, we first need to
make sense of the matrix of responsible innovation (Figure 2).
As the figure above illustrates, stagnation is generally understood as the
antithesis of innovation. If innovation (whatever we might mean it to be) is a
positively loaded term, then – as the model is binary – stagnation can only be
used in a negative way. Indeed, policy discussions of RI generally begin with
the reassurance that we all want innovation, that innovation is always a good
thing (see, for example, EESC, 2014) and therefore speeding up the innovation
process can only make things better. Similar assumptions are made about the
relationship of innovation to economic growth, so that any slowdown in the
activity of getting new things to the market (not in market activity per se) is
equated with the threat of economic stagnation (Blauwhof, 2012).
However, much depends upon exactly how one is defining innovation. The
idea that humans – an intensely curious and inventive species – would ever
stop innovating in terms of creating new objects and new ways of doing and
knowing things, and sharing this with others, seems incredibly unlikely. So, if
we define innovation as above, simply to mean bringing something novel into
the public sphere (whether for the purpose of creating exchange value or not),
then stagnation is an improbable concept and ‘responsible stagnation’ a vacuous
Figure 2. The two-by-two RI matrix.
Source: Adapted from Guston (2015, p. 2, Figure 1).
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term. It is only by restricting the meaning of innovation to ‘bringing new goods
and services to the market’ that ‘stagnation’ can take on meaning. The distinction
between innovation as circulation of novelty and innovation as bringing-to-market
is all-important when we try andmake sense of the interaction between innovation
and stagnation. For example, Innovation Union is aimed at generating 3 per cent
growth as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) across the EU. As RRI is
framed as an embedded part of Horizon 2020, which allocates research funding as
part of Innovation Union, this would suggest that, in order to be responsible,
innovation must contribute to GDP. The perverse corollary would be that inno-
vation which displays all the other desirable qualities of RI – sustainability, stew-
ardship, public engagement and equally distributed societal benefit – but in fact
reduces throughput and therefore reduces contribution to GDP, becomes de
facto irresponsible according to the matrix.
This, as we see it, is a key problem as RI becomes operationalized through
research policy. Just as the RI literature assumes techno-scientific innovation
to be inherently desirable, orthodox economics also assumes that growth is
inherently good, so that research policy is increasingly ‘shaped’ towards
growth through new technology, regardless of material cost. And while there
are now debates amongst economists about how we should measure growth
(for example, Fleurbaey, 2009; Stiglitz et al., 2010), there is not nearly
enough debate within policy circles about the feasibility, let alone the
wisdom, of attempting to return to pre-crisis levels of growth. Heterodox
macroeconomic theories which separate well-being from GDP have gained
both intellectual and popular legitimacy since the 2008 crisis (see Jackson,
2009; Dietz & O’Neill, 2013), but policymakers are still arguing for more inno-
vation to stimulate growth. Importantly, as discussed above, the prevailing view
is that if the pace of innovation slows, we stagnate the entire economy, causing
disastrous results (OECD, 2010).
Accepting for the purpose of this argument the definition of innovation as
only that which is for the market, true economic stagnation, with all its accom-
panying imagery of a fetid, decomposing swamp, is not actually possible within a
system of capital accumulation. As Schumpeter (1942 [2003]) argued, capitalism
is constantly in a state of creative destruction, growing and shrinking simul-
taneously as new technology makes processes, workers and material objects
obsolete and new sectors emerge. What we call stagnation is in fact still econ-
omic growth, but a prolonged period of very slow growth as measured by
GDP (Blanchard & Sheen, 2007). Therefore, any meaningful discussion on
stagnation of innovation can only take place within a context that limits the defi-
nition of ‘innovation’ to goods and services brought to market. Our question is
whether RI makes it possible deliberately to slow, change or even stop a trajec-
tory of market-based innovation because of reasonable concerns (in other words,
to practise responsible stagnation) without necessarily leading to stagnation of
the economy, and under what circumstances this might constitute not the oppo-
site of RI, but a crucial aspect of truly responsible innovation.
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Within the market-based definition, predicting exactly how stagnation of a par-
ticular line of innovation will affect the economy is exceedingly complex. First, the
effects of widespread stagnation in innovation on overall economic performance
would depend largely on how much non-market-oriented but productivity-chan-
ging innovation was still being created and whether for-market activities were
being displaced. Freecycle, for example, could stand accused of contributing to
stagnation within the retail economy, as it encourages people to recirculate
usable goods rather than purchase something new. As a niche activity, it does
not presently affect GDP in any significant way, but if similar practices of local
exchange, gift and barter were to be taken up widely within a national population
in the same way that recycling has been, this might not remain the case. Freecycle,
in fact, provides an excellent example of how socially beneficial innovation often
does the opposite of contributing to GDP, while contributing instead to social and
planetary well-being. This is a conundrum for RI within its current economic fra-
mework: while RI is meant to direct innovation towards globalized problems such
as climate change, the economic paradigm in which it is embedded calls for max-
imizing competitive economic output, even if this implies continued extraction of
diminishing resources or a disregard for mass unemployment of lower-skilled
workers due to automation. Innovation, therefore, occurs in a context in which
it is impossible for all, or even most, members of society to share its benefits,
let alone have the political capital to engage with its direction; a lacuna which
the RI literature also tends to neglect (van Oudheusden, 2014). We suggest that
a deeper exploration of arguments and models stemming from heterodox econ-
omics, particularly from ecological economics, might help provide insight into
the kind of macroeconomic paradigm which RI would require in order to fulfil
its call for innovation which can ‘respond to the needs and ambitions of society’
(EC, 2014) and provide real solutions to the complex problems we now face.
Heterodox paradigms to growth
Neo-classical economics takes the pursuit of economic growth, measured in
terms of increases in GDP year over year, as a fundamental good, if not a fun-
damental duty (Van den Berg, 2012). This ‘tyranny of growth’ (Latouche, 2005)
has increasingly come under pressure from two fronts. The first questions
whether GDP is in fact the right measure by which to be assessing growth,
while the second questions whether growth is, in and of itself, the inherent
good its proponents claim it is.
GDP, which measures the monetary value of all goods and services in circula-
tion within a specified region, is the textbook measure of economic activity (see
Blanchard & Sheen, 2007). However, there are some well-established alterna-
tives. The best known amongst these are theWorld Bank’s HumanDevelopment
Index (HDI), which combines GDP with other measures such as educational
outcome, life expectancy and infant mortality (UNDP, 2015). Another approach
is the Net National Product (NNP), or ‘the amount society can consume without
10 Economy and Society
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shortchanging the future’ (Nordhaus & Tobin, 1972), which, unlike GDP,
accounts for the reduction in natural resources as a result of production, subtract-
ing this from the monetary value of goods and services in circulation.
The argument that a developed economy would eventually reach the limits of
growth is neither radical nor new. The Solow (1956) model, which is generally
taken to represent a neo-classical model of growth, claims that, all else being
unchanged, economic activity will slow as a nation nears a ‘steady state’ in
which capital, consumption, output and population come to a balance. Once a
steady state is reached, GDP can still increase through an increase in popu-
lation, or the introduction of new technology which changes input, but only
at costs which tend to diminish returns. In other words, an economy below
its steady-state value will always grow much faster than one which is at or
above it because it has not yet reached maximum productivity; past this
point, there is little to be gained. While classical economists would generally
equate any slowdown in activity as undesirable stagnation, heterodox econom-
ists suggest that if a nation’s productivity is already high, it does not necessarily
follow that prosperity or material well-being will either stagnate or decline
(Dietz & O’Neill, 2013). Even John Stuart Mill understood that at some
point industrial progress would slow, capital and wealth would become ‘station-
ary’, and this did not necessarily mean that the conditions of life would cease to
improve (Jackson, 2009). While stagnation would indeed be a disaster in an
economy where the majority of the population’s basic needs are not being
met, a steady state in a rich nation may instead represent an optimal state of
equilibrium, ‘an economy with constant stocks of people and artefacts, main-
tained at some desired, sufficient levels’ (Daly, 1991, p. 17). This is not a
state of stagflation in which productivity slows while prices continue to rise,
but rather a stabilization of productivity across the entire economy which in
fact would be quite difficult either to reach or maintain.
Daly’s vision of a steady-state economy (SSE), like other challenges to the
growth-centred paradigm, is motivated by two core observations: first, that
the current consumption-based growth trajectory is not sustainable given the
limited environmental stock available, and second, that continuing economic
growth beyond that already achieved in developed countries does not necess-
arily lead to a bettering of the lives of the individuals in these countries (Stiglitz
et al., 2010). Innovation in an SSE is not directed towards finding new ways to
grow the economy, but rather towards finding ways to increase individual well-
being within a limited ecology (Jackson, 2009). Proponents of SSE have long
been dismissive of GDP as a useful measure of economic performance, precisely
because it ‘conflates qualitative improvement (development) with quantitative
increase (growth)’ (Daly, 2007, p. 15).
More recently, concerns over the limits of growth have led to arguments
for actively decreasing productivity (degrowth) in specific sectors of the
economy so as to ensure we remain within our ecological limits, despite
the inevitable decline in GDP (Kallis, 2011; Kerschner, 2010). Others,
however, even in ecological economics, predict this would create another
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‘implosion’ on a worse scale than 2008 (Klitgaard & Krall, 2012; Tokic,
2012). As a third way, van den Bergh (2011) has proposed an ‘a-growth’
paradigm, where we pursue socially and environmentally desirable ends
while remaining agnostic as to the consequence of our actions on GDP
growth. This a-growth paradigm is fundamentally about opposing GDP
as a measure, not about opposing growth per se. In fact, such a view is
much more reminiscent of Daly’s intentions with SSE than van den
Bergh might concede. The usefulness of GDP is arguably the core differ-
ence between the view espoused by proponents of SSE and the view sup-
ported by economists who claim that we should strive for sustained
economic growth, assuming development to occur in tandem, and techno-
logical progress to be key to both. To a large extent it also explains classical
economists’ view of the relationship between science and innovation, and
between innovation and economic growth. It is therefore unsurprising
that RI has become part of, rather than a challenge to, policies aimed at
increasing throughput to increase GDP. This is particularly true in the
European Union, where the policy activities of the Commission are answer-
able to the political agenda of a European Council which must placate both
business interests and voters back home, and thus appears increasingly com-
mitted to the incommensurable objectives of fiscal austerity and macroeco-
nomic growth (de Saille, 2015). But it is important to remind ourselves that
the classical economists’ definition of technological progress (from which
innovation gains its traction) is any change that leads to an increase in the
levels of output for the same levels of inputs, or, to the same levels of outputs
given lower levels of inputs. This makes no distinction as to whether that
change is a material object or an intangible process, or whether it is
enacted through the market. However, Blok and Lemmens (2015) argue
that in the policy setting, the term ‘innovation’ has increasingly become
restricted only to technological, patentable, commercialization of novelty,
because that is the only kind of innovation upon which a business model
can be based. We agree with the first premise, that RI, whether intentionally
or not, presently functions to reify the narrowing of both ‘innovation’ as a
term and free-market capitalism as the only viable economic paradigm.
Von Schomberg’s (2013, p. 63) oft-quoted formulation of RRI4 as ‘a trans-
parent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become
mutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability,
sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its mar-
ketable products’ would seem to uphold this argument. However, we are not
certain about the second premise, as we shall discuss in the next section.
Responsible stagnation
In so far as it is a policy innovation, anticipating and being reflexive about the
potential risks, benefits and impact of RI itself is essential if it is to achieve its
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loftier goals. RI discourse is partially shaped by the assumption that publicly
funded basic research will be taken up by industry–university partnerships
and developed into goods and services to be sold through spin-offs. One poss-
ible detrimental impact is the increasing burden placed upon scientists as RI
becomes a requirement for research funding at both UK and EU levels, particu-
larly when coupled with demands to produce research which can be commer-
cialized (Holloway, 2015). Emergent platform technologies such as nano- or
biotechnology promise to feed, warm and heal as well as enrich through creation
of GDP wealth and high-tech, well-paid jobs (Marris, 2015). However, there is
a danger that by claiming to have already anticipated and reflected on negative
impact ‘upstream’, while promissory research is still being done, RI will instead
redouble efforts to get these technologies to the market as quickly as possible,
before effective resistance movements can be formed (Singh, 2008). Some
areas of research have already generated so much public unease, particularly
about the quality and effectiveness of regulation, that attempts to commercialize
it have been forcibly (and in some opinions, irresponsibly) stagnated by wide-
spread resistance, and worry over the ‘failed’ attempt to commercialize GM
in Europe still lurks behind much of the discussion of RI, particularly when
viewed from the policymaker’s desk (see EC, 2013, p. 14). However, history
shows us that in certain instances, both policymakers and scientists have
chosen forms of what might be called stagnation – a slowdown or cessation of
activity – as the most responsible course of action in the face of uncertainty
and public unease. The voluntary moratorium on recombinant DNA research
in the early 1970s and the near worldwide ban on human reproductive
cloning provide two historical cases of what could be considered responsible
stagnation of scientific research.
RS in science
While (broad-based) innovation is unlikely ever to come to a complete halt, RS
in research can indeed mean a programme is paused or even abandoned.
Perhaps the best, or at least the most powerfully remembered, example is the
Asilomar conference held in 1975. This meeting of scientists, journalists, policy-
makers and lawyers – what might now be called multi-stakeholder engagement –
was held to determine under what conditions research on recombinant DNA, at
that point under a voluntary year-long moratorium, could be done responsibly.
Writing about Asilomar over 30 years later, one of its organizers surmised that it
was proof that the best way for controversial research to progress was for pub-
licly funded scientists to respond openly to concerns and involve the public
early on in discussions about how to regulate such research, because once cor-
porate scientists entered the field, it would ‘simply be too late’ (Berg, 2008,
p. 291): economic interest would take over. Asilomar persists as a cultural refer-
ent, partly because it succeeded in allowing a controversial programme of
research to continue, but also because it casts science as having taken a
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principled stance by stopping to clarify where it was heading, both for those who
would do the research, and as a means of seeking public legitimation (Hurlbut,
2015).
Similarly, reproductive cloning formed part of a larger discussion in the early
1980s about the regulation of assisted reproduction. While embryo research was
eventually allowed in most countries, the general consensus which prohibited
research into human reproductive cloning has so far held, and was perhaps
even strengthened after the birth of Dolly the Sheep in 1997, which proved
the process was viable in mammals. In the very public debate which ensued
after a pair of already-controversial IVF doctors and a religious cult5 swore to
create a cloned child no matter where they had to go to do the research, the
scientists who had created Dolly argued vociferously against ever using the
technique in humans, calling the idea ‘repugnant’ (Wilmut et al., 2000).
Rather than stopping research altogether, the debate helped clarify an ethical
position which claimed that using the somatic cell nuclear transfer technique
to produce human beings was a separate issue from using it to clone prize live-
stock, or produce human embryos with a patient’s DNA in order to harvest
stem cells for medical treatment. In this instance, scientific agreement that
some applications of an innovation should not be pursued allowed controversial
research in the overall field to continue, albeit under strict control. In other
words, cessation or imposition of regulation on one specific pathway for an
innovation does not necessarily mean stagnation of the whole.
Another case might be the adoption of Directive 86/809/EEC in the EU in
2012, which codified the ‘3Rs’ in animal research – reduce, refine, replace – into
law as a form of controlled degrowth in the use of animals for experimentation.
While initially it seemed possible that animal researchers would simply relocate
elsewhere (Wells, 2011), ultimately the Directive seems to have opened up
opportunities for innovation in tissue culture, nanotechnology and research
into ways of obtaining results without animal models (research*eu, 2015).
The 3Rs could be considered a form of RS, analogous to input reduction in
the larger economy by using less or different materials to gain the same
result, guided by ethical principles which seek to protect a basic activity, but
substantially reduce its harm. The case also points to deeper questions about
the ‘human-centric’ nature of RRI (McLeod, 2015) and the interplay of RRI
with other aspects of European Union law.
Last, there is the original example of RS, although it is likely that many within
the field of RI would not see it as such. The EPSRC developed its version of RI
as part of a project which looked at seeding the atmosphere with nanoparticles to
combat climate change. The test bed stage of the project was halted due to
public unease (and/or patent conflicts, depending upon who is telling the
story) and is now used as an example of successful stage-gating, where pauses
are built into the research strategy to consider how best or even whether to
proceed (Stilgoe et al., 2013). RS in science, therefore, need not be something
to fear and does not necessarily call for a complete or even permanent halt to a
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research programme. Rather, as seen in all four cases above, it can be an integral
component of a responsible approach to mitigating potential harm.
RS in business: the benefit corporation
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes have had an uneven
implementation, in part because of the shaping of corporate governance
itself, where truly beneficial but expensive actions cannot be taken by man-
agers who are restricted by the obligation to maximize shareholder returns
as their first priority (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2010). ‘Benefit corporations’,
or b corps, are a recent legal innovation which allows for-profit corporations
to pursue goals besides maximization of profit. B corps have ‘a purpose to
create a material positive impact on society and the environment; [and]
are required to consider the impact of their decisions not only on share-
holders but also on workers, community, and the environment’ (Benefit-
corp.net, 2015). Unlike traditional shareholders, investors in B corps
cannot sue if ethical decision-making reduces investment returns. Instead,
they can sue the company for not living up to its primary philanthropic obli-
gations. From the first laws passed in Maryland in 2010, preliminary data
suggest there are presently over 2,100 B corps in the United States
(Berrey, 2015), and close to 1,500 in the EU since they became legal in
April 2015 (mhoftijzer, 2015).
One example of this movement is Patagonia, which sells outdoor equipment
and engages in extensive R&D with scientific and industrial partners, for
example, seeking to develop a plant-based substitute for the petroleum-based
neoprene used in wet suits (Patagonia, 2015a). It focuses heavily on reducing
its footprint of production, as well as improving the quality, sustainability and
recyclability of its products, many of which are now made from reclaimed
wool, cotton and polyester. Patagonia has also attempted to reduce the toxic
effects of pesticides used for producing cotton by switching to organic,
despite fear that the much higher cost of production would put it out of
business. By choosing a modest price increase coupled with a substantial
reduction in both products for sale and profit margins, the company proved
such transitions were possible and is now a prime mover in the organic
cotton movement (Patagonia, 2015b). However, Patagonia is probably most
famous for taking out ads in major US newspapers on Black Friday in 2011
(the day after Thanksgiving, which has become a consumer stampede to get
sale-price goods), explaining the exact environmental footprint of one of their
most popular jackets, including water consumed and carbon produced, and
urging people not to buy what they do not need, but to recycle, repair and
re-use their Patagonia goods instead.6
Because its specific clientele tends to be environmentally conscious, compe-
tition in the outdoor equipment industry is not just about pricing and quality,
but also about who has the most sustainable manufacturing and ethical labour
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practices along their supply chain. Patagonia therefore has an element of leeway
which might not exist in other industries; however, even so, its business model is
probably best described as a-growth. This is partly a result of creditors calling in
their loans during the 1991 recession, a disaster which nearly bankrupted the
company and has made its founder growth-wary ever since (Chouinard, 2013).
As a form of RS in business (for example, by phasing out traditional cotton
over a period of two years to avoid a sudden shock to their former suppliers,
or ceasing to sell lucrative but environmentally costly goods) Patagonia and
other B corps suggest that it is possible to place social and environmental concerns
first all along their value chain and, despite being a-growth, still increase profit –
the company is now valued at over $700 m (Bradley, 2015). Additionally, Patago-
nia self-taxes 1 per cent of sales to be donated to environmental charities and
allows employees time off to do research or join campaigns (Patagonia, 2015c).
Since RI seeks to point innovation towards socially beneficial technology
aimed at solving complex, global problems, there may be much to be learned
from the B corp movement, in particular about sharing benefits with commu-
nities which often do not experience ‘technological progress’ in a positive
manner. We suggest not that RI can only be enacted through a B corp, but
rather that the existence of a new alternative legal framework for governance
of for-profit corporations is an innovative and welcome step away from maxi-
mizing output/shareholder value models and an under-researched area which
may contribute much to the discussion of both RS and RI.
Why should we study responsible stagnation?
In the discussion above, we have outlined some preliminary cases of what we
might call RS, which we have identified for deeper study in subsequent
work. We now turn to the question of why we think the study of RS is an impor-
tant component of RI scholarship, and what we think might be learned. In his
masterwork, The Great Transformation, Polanyi suggested that:
It should need no elaboration that a process of undirected change, the pace of
which is deemed too fast, should be slowed down, if possible, so as to safeguard
the welfare of the community… (Polanyi, 2001, pp. 32–33)
This, we would suggest, is the underpinning of our idea of Responsible Stagna-
tion. Polanyi’s work argues that economics is a set of social relationships; where
these relationships have become ‘disembedded’, so that monetary interests out-
weigh social interests, capitalism may provide wealth for a few, but at an enor-
mous cost for the rest. Anticipation, reflection, inclusion and responsive action
require time and effort, which is against the prevailing policy discourse of
seeking ways to remove barriers to innovation and reduce regulation, and a
more expensive process than traditional shareholders are likely to support.
We suggest that in order to achieve a ‘proper embedding of innovation in
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society’ (von Schomberg, 2013), some elements of RS will need to be incorpor-
ated into the discussion of RI, so that social and ecological costs hold equal, if
not more, importance than projected possible economic benefits as its frame-
work activities are carried out. Arguments and measurement tools being devel-
oped by institutions such as the Centre for Steady State Economics (CASSE)
and the New Economics Society may provide new ideas for discussions about
what constitutes responsible innovation, helping to find (and define) the
optimal balance for new sectors, and incorporating better ways to measure
environmental and social costs, including the distribution of negative impact,
such as environmental depletion and job losses, to offset the rhetoric of jobs
created and GDP achieved. RI then becomes not just a matter of upstream
public engagement to successfully embed an innovation in the market, but a
way of using anticipation and reflexivity to consider the most socially and envir-
onmentally responsible pathway to reach a specific goal, and then developing
the best solutions for achieving it.
We also wonder, not just what SSE can offer to RI, but what RI might offer to
SSE as it seeks policy alternatives to limit resource use and waste production,
and encourage changes in business practices, consumer behaviour and policy
goals (Dietz & O’Neill, 2013). We see possibility for RS, as part of the RI frame-
work, to help unpick the very confusing messages presently emanating from the
media (Consume less! Buy more!) and from a political establishment simul-
taneously demanding both austerity and growth. The incommensurability of
these objectives suggests that, as social actors, politicians, academics and econ-
omists are as confused about how to achieve a sustainable future as the increas-
ingly disempowered public (Bryan et al., 2012). Finding our way out of the
present financial crisis will require much more than growth; it will require a
concerted effort to understand the intertwined crises for nature and society as
well (Fraser, 2014).
RI suggests itself partly as a decision-making endeavour, allowing a debate on
impacts, benefits and motivations for technological development to occur far
upstream, before innovation pathways are set. This would imply that its main
activities take place at a point where multiple pathways are still possible. We
argue that considering RS as a genuine option allows for a wider debate, and
a broader set of policy options about the role of innovation in our economic
system and the real-world consequences of continuing to seek productivity
growth. We have argued that the present socio-technical political economy
relies upon the parallel assumptions that innovation/growth is always good,
therefore more and faster innovation/growth must be better. Within this
single-minded responsibility to innovate to increase GDP, RI can do little to
question whether growth is truly desirable, or even necessary for a flourishing
society, let alone whether a risky innovation pathway can achieve its projected
goals. It may be argued that what we are suggesting is beyond the scope of
what RI can or should do. However, we are not certain why that should be
the case, or indeed how RI can achieve its objective of socially beneficial inno-
vation to solve complex problems if it cannot question its own normative
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conditions, change trajectories or suggest that certain areas are too environmen-
tally or socially costly to pursue. In this sense, we consider RI itself to be a social
innovation which should also be subjected to the anticipate–reflect–engage–act
framework (EPSRC, 2015a).
Our research, preliminary though it is, suggests that rather than an empty
space or a dead, fetid pond, the quadrant for Responsible Stagnation is full of
rich ideas and vibrant, highly inventive (in the broadest possible sense of the
word) activities, aimed at a fundamental transformation of the relationship
between production, consumption and quality of life. Opening the black box
of RS allows us to question normative economic assumptions which equate
technology with social progress, progress with economic growth and economic
growth with individual well-being in all its forms. We do not suggest that inno-
vation, progress and growth must stop, but rather that RS, as an integral com-
ponent of RI and not its antithesis, provides a mechanism through which those
assumptions can be made visible and questioned, opening possibilities for inno-
vation directed at achieving social, ecological and economic equilibrium and for
reducing input rather than always seeking to produce more. It may, in fact, be
necessary to get rid of the matrix entirely, to move away from the two binaries
setting innovation and stagnation in opposition to each other, in order to under-
stand the part that both will have to play in the transition to the more sustain-
able, more socially equitable society RI claims to want.
We invite others to pursue this programme of research with us.
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Notes
1 Variously acronymed as ARIR (Stilgoe et al., 2013) or AREA (EPSRC, 2015a).
18 Economy and Society
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Sh
eff
iel
d]
 at
 02
:29
 06
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
2 There has been some question as to whether this ‘success’ is due to acceptance, or to
lack of labelling, so that the public is not generally aware of how much nanotechnology is
already in many products they consume (Falkner et al., 2009).
3 As of October 2015, the original press release could no longer be found on the
ESRC’s website. It is mirrored at http://phys.org/news/2012-08-uk-hotel-industry-
alive.html.
4 We use RI here as the generic and RRI to refer specifically to EU policy.
5 Both doctors (Severino Antinori and Panos Zavos) and the Raelian cult claimed in
the early 2000s to have engineered cloned children, but these claims were never verified.
6 The campaign was selected, with some bemusement, by Adweek as its ad of the day
(Nudd, 2011).
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